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EVIDENCE-CORROBORATION OF EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION-QUANTUM OF
INDEPENDENTEV i DENCE REqumED To SUSTAIN CONVICTION-Sent to a hotel
room at midnight to investigate reports of a contemplated robbery, the
police found the defendant and another man, strangers in town, with
loaded revolvers nearby. After defendant failed to account for the guns,
the police confronted him with the robbery report, and he signed a con-
fession. On appeal of his conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery, held,
reversed, two justices dissenting in part. If evidence independent of the
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confession is such that reasonable minds could believe that the crime was
in fact committed, the corpus delicti is sufficiently established to make
the confession admissible. The independent evidence in this case is in-
adequate for that purpose. State v. Weldon, (Utah 1957) 314 P. (2d) 353.
In most American jurisdictions, a felony conviction cannot be supported
solely by an extrajudicial confession.' Sir Mathew Hale first proposed, as
a rule of evidence, that some evidence independent of the confession was
essential. 2 While this concept failed to crystallize in the English decisions,3
American jurisdictions first stated the requirement as a rule of law. This
was justified by reliance on the writers, 4 interpretations of the common
law,5 an asserted inherent unreliability of the extrajudicial confession,6
and policy demands that conviction for non-existent crimes be prevented.
7
Generally, the independent evidence required by the rule must relate to
the corpus delicti.8 Almost all courts9 agree that the independent evidence
need not establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt or by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.10 But the authorities are apparently divided on
the extent to which corpus delicti" must be shown by the independent
1127 A.L.R. 1131 (1940); 45 A.L.R. (2d) 1320 (1956); 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 638 at 641,
n. 22 (1955). Compare State v. Gilbert, 36 Vt. 145 (1863), with People v. Lowey, Horovits
and Fischer, Inc., 186 Misc. 745, 60 .N.Y.S. (2d) 145 (1946).
2 2 HALE P.C. 280 (1680). See 7 WiMoRE, EvmENcE, 3d ed., §2081 (1940).
3 See 7 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2070 (1940).
4 WHARTON, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW, 2d ed., §683 (1852); 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE,
2d ed., §216 (1844).
5 People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. (N.Y.) 147 (1836).
6 See 4 BLAcKsT. COMM. *357; 1 EAST P.C. 133 (1806); 1 R.C.L. 588 (1914). Inherent
unreliability is based on two grounds. First, the confession is often the product of a
disturbed mind. See State v. Dena, 28 N.M. 479, 214 P. 583 (1923); State v. Johnson, 95
Utah 572, 83 P. (2d) 1010 (1938); State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373, 44 N.W. (2d) 24 (1950).
Second, the confession is often the result of reprehensible police tactics. See EastV. State,
146 Tex. Crim. 396, 175 S. W. (2d) 603 (1942); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
But see note 16 infra.
7 See State v. Howard, 102 Ore. 431, 203 P. 311 (1911); Barnes v. State, 199 Miss.
86, 23 S. (2d) 405 (1945). This policy demand grew primarily from The Boom Brothers'
Case, 6 Am. ST. TRALS 73 (1916). See also WIGMoRE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF, 2d
ed., §§223, 224 (1931).
8 See 127 A.L.R. 1134 (1940); 45 A.L:R. (2d) 1327 (1956). Two states and -wo federal
circuits require only that the independent evidence support the credibility of the con-
fession. State v. Cardwell, 90 Kan. 606, 135 P. 597 (1913); Wiggins v. United States, (9th
Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 950; Anderson v. United States, (6th Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 58, revd.
on other grounds 318 U.S. 350 (1943); Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643, 65 A. (2d) 316 (1948).
See also People v. Lueder, 3 Ill. (2d) 487, 121 N.E. (2d) 743 (1954); Martinez v. People,
129 Colo. 94, 267 P. (2d) 654 (1954); Warszower v. United States, 312 US. 342 (1941).
But see Parker v. State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E. (2d) 556 (1949); United States v. Calderon,
348 U.S. 160 (1954).
9 The only clear exception is Pennsylvania. Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380
(1882). The status of the law on the point in Georgia is doubtful. See 45 A.L.R. (2d)
1335 (1956). See also 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 638 at 674 (1955).
10 See 127 A.L.R. 1139 (1940); 45 A.L.R. (2d) 1331 (1956).
11 In all jurisdictions the corpus delicd consists of the criminal result and the criminal
agency producing it. See 103 UNIV. PA. L. Rxv. 638 at 649, n. 63 (1955).
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evidence: one line requires an independent showing of each essential
element, but allows the confession to support the independent evidence;
the other requires support for some essential element of the corpus delicti
by independent evidence, but allows the confession to fill in missing details
or give meaning to otherwise ambiguous evidence.12 Neither is there
agreement on the quantum of evidence required by the rule. Some juris-
dictions have attempted to state an objective test, requiring a "prima
facie" showing of the corpus delicti.' 3 Others require that the independent
evidence be sufficient to persuade reasonable minds that a crime has in
fact been committed.14 In any form, the rule is subject to several cogent
criticisms.' 5 There is -little reason to regard the extrajudicial confession as
inherently unreliable. 16 The danger of conviction for non-existent crimes
is greatly exaggerated. 17 One can still commit judicial suicide, despite the
rule, by a judicial confession.' 8 There is no reason to treat the extra-
judicial confession differently from other competent evidence; its credi-
bility should be determined by the jury under proper instructions.19 But
the rule is so firmly established in our legal system as to be virtually unas-
sailable. 20 Attention should be directed, therefore, to the main problem
in applying the rule: what quantum of independent evidence should it
require? The flexible test, requiring sufficient independent evidence to
12 See id. at 656, notes 101 and 102. Even in states where independent proof of each
element of the corpus delicti is required, less proof of the criminal agency is often re-
quired than of the criminal result. McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E. (2d) 462 (1949).
And the two lines of authority have been reconciled on the basis of differences in the
nature of the corpus delicti involved. State v. Cardwell, 90 Kan. 606, 135 P. 597 (1913).
13 Some states require an objective showing which, however, is somewhat less than
a prima facie case. See 103 UNiv. PA. L. Rxv. 638 at 659 and 660, notes 113 and 114 (1955).
One common practice in jurisdictions following the objective standard requirement is
to apply the standard on an ad hoc basis in each case. Compare State v. Hoffses, 147 Me.
221, 85 A. (2d) 919 (1952), with State v. Carleton, 148 Me. 237, 92 A. (2d) 327 (1952) and
State v. Jones, 150 Me. 242, 108 A. (2d) 261 (1954). Another is to change the objective
standard itself in different cases as the facts require. See Hardin v. State, 109 Ala. 50,
19 S. 494 (1896); Granison v. State, 117 Ala. 22, 23 S. 146 (1897); Daniels v. State, 12
Ala. App. 119, 68 S. 499 (1915); iBraxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 82 S. 657 (1919).
14 See 103 UNIV. PA. L. RiEv. 638 at 660, n. 115 (1955); principal case at 357.
15 See principal case at 355. Massachusetts and Wisconsin have rejected the rule.
Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E. (2d) 468 (1947); Potman v. State, 259
Wis. 234, 47 N.W. (2d) 884 (1951). England applies the rule only in murder and bigamy
cases. 9 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND, 2d ed., §§21, 268 (1933).
16See note 10 supra. The psycopathic mind generally assumes responsibility for an
offense actually committed. Police brutality usually results only when enforcement officers
have knowledge of an existent crime. In either instance, the rule affords no protection.
See Commonwealth v. Knapp, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 495 (1830); Cayford's Case, 7 Me. 57
(1830); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954);
3 WMoRE, EvIDENCE, 3d ed., §867 (1940).
17 3 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE, 3d ed., §867 (1940).
18 The judicial confession requires no independent evidence. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
3d ed., §821 (1940).
19 The extrajudicial confession is competent evidence. See 45 A.L.R. (2d) 1334 (1956).
20 See Daeche v. United States, (2d Cir. 1918) 250 F. 566.
persuade reasonable minds that a crime has in fact been committed,
seems the soundest standard.21 An objective standard is said by some to be
easier to apply,22 but the sufficiency of the independent evidence must
still be determined subjectively by the judge regardless of the standard
stated. Further, ease in reciting a formula too often results in ignoring the
factors which should be controlling. 23 Consequently, while the majority's
application of the reasonable sufficiency test to the facts of the principal
case can be criticized,24 the court is to be commended for adopting the
most rational quantum test available.
Thomas A. Dieterich
2 lVariables which should influence the quantum of independent evidence required
by the rule include the seriousness of the crime, the nature of the crime, the availability
of independent evidence, the circumstances in which the confession was obtained, and
its apparent credibility.
22 Principal case at 358.
23 Ibid.
24 This crime is neither serious nor likely to evoke a confession by mental disturbance
or police brutality. Little independent evidence is available, since the crime itself is
nebulous. The confession was obtained in circumstances which support its credibility,
and was readily believable on its face. The independent evidence presented (see state-
ment of facts) should have been sufficient to sustain the conviction.
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